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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN COLLATERAL, POST-
CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
DANIEL GIVELBER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Hornbook constitutional law tells us that the state has no obliga-
tion to provide counsel to a defendant beyond his first appeal as of
right.1 The Supreme Court has rejected arguments that either the
Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause require that the
right to counsel apply to collateral, post-conviction proceedings.2 The
Court also has rejected the argument that the Eighth Amendment re-
quires that the right to an attorney attach to post-conviction proceed-
ings specifically in capital cases.' Without resolving the issue, the
Court has acknowledged the possibility that there may be a limited
right to counsel if a particular constitutional claim can be raised only
in post-conviction proceedings.4 Despite their apparently definitive
quality, none of the three cases addressing these issues involved a de-
fendant who actually had gone through a post-conviction collateral
proceeding unrepresented.5
* Interim Dean and Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. I wish
to thank Monica Kieser and Dennis Murphy, both 1999 graduates of the Northeastern Law
School, for their invaluable research assistance.
1. JOSHUA DRESSIER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 29.03[c], at 521 (2d ed.
1997) (discussing the "no-right-to-counsel principle" in discretionary appeals, state habeas
corpus proceedings, and petitions for certiorari).
2. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (noting that the Court has
never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral
attacks upon their convictions" because "the right to appointed counsel extends to the first
appeal of right, and no further" (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969))).
3. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (asserting that
the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment during trial are "sufficient to assure
the reliability of the process by which the death penalty is imposed").
4. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991) (discussing the possibility of
an exception to the rule of Finley and Giarratano in those instances where state collateral
review is the first forum in which a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction," but
refusing to resolve the question because the defendant's claims were addressed in the state
habeas proceeding).
5. See id. at 755 (noting that the petitioner was represented in state habeas proceed-
ings, but that he sought to use the attorney's error in those proceedings as cause for fed-
eral review); Murray, 492 U.S. at 14 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (providing the deciding vote
against a claim by Virginia death row inmates that the Constitution requires counsel in
post-conviction proceedings, but explicitly noting that "no prisoner on death row in Vir-
ginia has been unable to obtain counsel to represent him in postconviction proceedings");
Finley, 481 U.S. at 553, 559 (noting that the petitioner was represented in her post-convic-
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More recently, the Supreme Court suggested a different ap-
proach to the requirements of due process. In M.L.B. v. S.L.J, it held
that the state could not dismiss an appeal of a termination of parental
rights on the ground that the litigant had failed to pay a record prepa-
ration fee that she was unable to afford: "[W] e place decrees forever
terminating parental rights in the category of cases in which the State
may not 'bolt the door to equal justice."' 6 If the importance of the
interest at stake can require the state to waive fees, so as to open ac-
cess to a process that the state is not constitutionally required to pro-
vide to all regardless of ability to pay, then the interest in one's own
life would appear to demand at least as much.
Indeed, recently the Mississippi Supreme Court heard a death
row prisoner's motion for appointment of counsel and payment of
reasonable litigation expenses in state post-conviction proceedings
under Mississippi's Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act
(UPCCRA).7 The prisoner was able to secure review of his motion
without actually having to conduct a post-conviction hearing unaided
by counsel.8 The court held that "a death row inmate [ ] is entitled to
appointed and compensated counsel to represent him in his state
post-conviction efforts."9 Comparing the parental rights at issue in
M.L.B. to the rights at stake in a capital post-conviction proceeding,
the court reasoned that "[a] ccess to equal justice is an even greater
interest where the State seeks to impose the penalty of death."1" The
Jackson court noted that, unlike the situation that pertained in Vir-
ginia when Murray v. Giarratano" was decided, "[i]n Mississippi, re-
peatedly, since 1995, death row inmates have been unable to obtain
counsel or requisite help from institutional lawyers."' 2
Although the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted Jackson's mo-
tion on the basis of M.L.B., the latter case concerned formal access to
courts-the payment of a record preparation fee that an indigent
mother was unable to afford. By contrast, Jackson concerned effective
tion proceeding, but holding that the attorney's failure to follow federal procedures for
withdrawing from a case did not violate petitioner's rights).
6. 519 U.S. 102, 124 (1996) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring)).
7. Jackson v. State, 732 So. 2d 187 (Miss. 1999) (en banc).
8. Id. at 189.
9. Id. at 191.
10. Id.
11. See 492 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "[w]hile Virginia
has not adopted procedures for securing representation that are as far reaching and effec-
tive as those available in other States, no prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable
to obtain counsel to represent him in postconviction proceedings").
12. Jackson, 732 So. 2d at 191.
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access to courts.13 In the view of the Supreme Court of Mississippi,
failing to provide counsel in state post-conviction proceedings for
death row inmates:
ignores the reality that indigent death row inmates are sim-
ply not able, on their own, to competently engage in this
type of litigation. Applications for post-conviction relief
often raise issues which require investigation, analysis and
presentation of facts outside the appellate record. The in-
mate is confined, unable to investigate, and often without
training in the law or the mental ability to comprehend the
requirements of the UPCCRA. The inmate is in effect de-
nied meaningful access to the courts by lack of funds for this
state-provided remedy.' 4
One can sympathize with the Mississippi Supreme Court's view
that an individual's interest in the continuation of her life is at least as
weighty as a parent's interest in preserving access to her children.
One can also predict that the Supreme Court of the United States is
unlikely to follow where reason led the Mississippi Supreme Court.
This unlikelihood is not due to an error in the Mississippi court's rea-
soning, but to its consequences. The problems are doctrinal and
practical.
Doctrinally, the Court rejects the idea that process is still due a
defendant who has been fairly convicted and sentenced. 5 In the
Court's view, while the defendant is entitled to counsel and an adver-
sary trial before he can be convicted, this is the limit of the process
that he is actually due. 6 Because the state need not provide any ap-
pellate mechanism at all,' 7 it has no obligation to provide an attorney
13. Cf Brad Snyder, Note, Disparate Impact on Death Row: M.L.B. and the Indigent's Right
to Counsel at Capital State Postconviction Proceedings, 107 YALE L.J. 2211, 2213 (1998) (arguing
that "the Court should use M.L.B., the fundamental right of access to the criminal process
[as set forth in Griffin and its progeny], and wealth-based disparate impact theory to shift
the current state of equal protection law so as to provide counsel at state postconviction
review for indigent death row inmates").
14. Jackson, 732 So. 2d at 190. But see Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 190 (Ga. 1999)
(holding that " [n ] either the federal nor Georgia constitutions require the appointment of
a lawyer for a death-row inmate to have meaningful access to the courts upon habeas
corpus").
15. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974) (determining that a state need not
provide an indigent criminal defendant with counsel on appeal because, by contrast to a
criminal trial, in which the right to counsel is fundamental, due process does not require a
state to "provide any appeal at all" (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894))).
16. Id. at 611.
17. See McKane, 153 U.S. at 687 (holding that the decision to provide appellate review
"is wholly within the discretion of the State"). Of course, since McKane, the Court has not
been faced with a case in which a state actually denied any appellate process following a
13951999]
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for such a proceeding. Although anti-discrimination considerations
blunt the force of this logic to the extent that a defendant is entitled
to legal representation for the first appeal as of right,"8 the Court has
established that fundamental fairness does not require that a defend-
ant be able to challenge the validity of his conviction.19
This remarkably sanguine view of the fairness of the criminal trial
process is one which has commended itself to no jurisdiction, state or
federal. The right to appeal is ubiquitous and increasing.2 0 For exam-
ple, every state employing capital punishment provides for an appeal
as of right to the highest court of the state in capital cases.21 There is
an odd dissonance between the Court's apparent satisfaction with the
accuracy and appropriateness of the result of a trial and the universal
perception that we ought not imprison someone, much less execute
him, unless an appellate court has examined alleged errors. 22
criminal conviction. Nor was it faced with such a situation in McKane itself. See id. at 685-
86 (noting that the defendant was allowed to appeal to the New York Supreme Court and
that the issue concerned whether he was entitled to ball pending appeal). Nonetheless,
the discretionary character of the appellate process is an oft repeated truism about consti-
tutional criminal procedure. See generally Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right
to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503 (1992) (inviting review of the current status of
the constitutional right to a criminal appeal by examining three views of due process).
18. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-58 (1963) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that an indigent criminal defendant receive the benefit of counsel
when a state statute grants a first appeal from a criminal conviction as a matter of right);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion) (determining that the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses require states to provide indigent criminal defend-
ants with transcripts of their trial if a transcript is a prerequisite for an appeal).
19. See supra note 17; see also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) ("Our
cases establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and
no further. Thus, we have rejected suggestions that we establish a right to counsel on
discretionary appeals." (citing Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982); Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600 (1974))).
20. But see Arkin, supra note 17, at 508-09 (arguing that, in an effort to manage over-
crowded court dockets, some courts and commentators are proposing to curtail the right
to a first appeal).
21. See Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbi-
trary Death Sentences, 43 Burr. L. REv. 329, 354-55 (1995) (noting that, while it is unclear
whether judicial review of a death sentence is required under Supreme Court decisions,
"[m]ost states provide an automatic appeal to the highest appellate court in the state," and
that "a few states also provide an appeal as of right to an intermediate appellate court").
22. The Supreme Court has never been confronted with a case involving a state crimi-
nal process that did not provide any possibility of review. The Court first articulated the
proposition that states need not provide any appellate review in 1894:
An appeal from a judgment of conviction is not a matter of absolute right, inde-
pendently of constitutional or statutory provisions allowing such appeal. A review
by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case ... was not at
common law and is not now a necessary element of due process of law.
McKane, 153 U.S. at 687. This proposition, however, is not the square holding of the case,
because McKane considered only the claim that the Privileges and Immunities Clause re-
1396
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On a practical level, the Court has been concerned, most imme-
diately, about the effect of recognizing the right to counsel for such
standard post-conviction proceedings as a petition for certiorari.23
One may presume that the Court does not want to undertake the re-
sponsibility of securing counsel for the approximately 5000 in forma
pauperis petitions filed annually.24 And what would the obligation
mean for the states? Would they be required to provide counsel for
every person seeking review by the state supreme court of an affirm-
ance at the intermediate appellate court level, or for every person
seeking collateral, post-conviction relief?
Attempting to limit the right to counsel only to those who are
facing particularly severe penalties would reintroduce the difficulties
that characterized Betts v. Brady.25 Limiting this right to defendants
who face death would take seriously the Eighth Amendment prohibi-
tion against arbitrariness in capital cases,2 6 but the application of this
right even to these cases would open the possibility of a doctrinal ex-
pansion that the current Court seems unlikely to endorse. For exam-
ple, if more serious cases call for more resources, the Court would
quired New York to follow the practice of most other states, which allowed a defendant
convicted of a criminal charge other than murder to post bail pending appeal. Id. The
Court rejected this argument on the ground that an appeal is not a matter of right. Id.
This proposition continues to be cited more recently. See, e.g., Ross, 417 U.S. at 611 ("[I]t is
clear that the State need not provide any appeal at all." (citing McKane, 153 U.S. 684)).
While this is not the place for an extended analysis of McKane, at a minimum the Court's
continued insistence that contemporary post-conviction criminal procedure exceeds the
requirements of the Constitution requires more support than dicta from a century-old pre-
cedent that did not address the situation of a state that had denied the right to appeal. See
generally Arkin, supra note 17 (providing a comprehensive analysis of these issues).
23. Cf. Vick, supra note 21, at 416 (noting that "[w]ith the ascent to the federal bench
of conservatives sympathetic to public impatience with delays carrying out death sentences,
the federal courts have been increasingly unreceptive to habeas claims" (footnote
omitted)).
24. See Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 170 F.R.D.
201, 269 (1996) (statement of Justice Ginsburg) (noting that in forma pauperis petitions
rose to 5380 on the 1994 Supreme Court Docket).
25. 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not grant an indigent defendant the right to counsel unless there is a
finding that special circumstances require such representation to ensure fundamental fair-
ness), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (reversing death
sentences on Eighth Amendment grounds); id. at 306, 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) (not-
ing that, in light of the unique nature of the death penalty, it violates the Eighth Amend-
ment for this penalty to "be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed"); Vick, supra note 21, at
340-56 (discussing the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence since Furman,
which has established procedural and substantive protections in order to reduce arbitrari-
ness in capital cases).
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need to reconsider its decision in United States v. Cronic,27 which re-
jected per se approaches to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.2 8
The other major difficulty with recognizing a constitutional right
to an attorney at state post-conviction proceedings is that the Court
has chosen to achieve finality by limiting those situations in which a
defendant can raise in federal habeas a claim that was not fully adjudi-
cated in state court to instances where counsel's failure to raise the
claim was constitutionally inadequate. 29 Counsel can only be constitu-
tionally inadequate, however, if the Constitution requires that the de-
fendant be represented at a particular proceeding.30 A court
determined to limit post-conviction proceedings in this way is unlikely
to expand the right to counsel to new proceedings, precisely because
it is through claims of ineffectiveness of counsel that a litigant is able
to perpetuate post-conviction proceedings."
Even if the Court were prepared to acknowledge a constitutional
right to counsel in collateral proceedings, what would this give us? A
lawyer who is constitutionally ineffective under Strickland's limp stan-
27. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
28. In Cronic, the trial court appointed a "young lawyer with a real estate practice to
represent" the defendant, who had been indicted on complex mail fraud charges. Id. at
649. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction, not
because it found that his lawyer's "actual performance had prejudiced the defense," id. at
650, but because it inferred ineffective assistance of counsel in light of the surrounding
circumstances, including: (1) the time afforded for investigation and preparation; (2) the
experience of counsel; (3) the gravity of the charge; (4) the complexity of possible de-
fenses; and (5) the accessibility of witnesses to counsel. Id. at 652. Rejecting this inferen-
tial approach, the Supreme Court held that, upon remand, the defendant could "make out
a claim of ineffective assistance only by pointing to specific errors made by trial counsel."
Id. at 666.
For a state supreme court's similar rejection of a per se approach to due process
claims, see Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 79-80 (Ala. 1985) (holding that Alabama's
statutory limit of $1000 compensation for attorneys appointed to represent indigent de-
fendants does not violate a defendant's due process and equal protection rights in a capital
case). See also Ex parte Smith, 698 So. 2d 219, 224 (Ala.) (noting that the $1000 cap applies
only to "fees for an attorney's out-of-court work" and that counsel may be entitled to cer-
tain other out-of-court expenses), cert. denied 522 U.S. 957 (1997).
29. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991) (noting that, when the state is
obligated to provide competent counsel, a default due to the denial of effective assistance
of counsel "as a constitutional matter" must be imputed to the state, so that a petitioner
may raise her claim in a federal habeas proceeding).
30. See id. at 757 ("Because [defendant] had no right to counsel to pursue his appeal in
state habeas, any attorney error that led to the default of [defendant's] claims in state
court cannot constitute cause to excuse the default in federal habeas.").
31. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-98 (1984) (noting that the prisoner
in this case sought collateral relief, after conviction, on the ground of ineffective assistance
of counsel at a capital sentencing hearing and setting forth the standard for determining
ineffective assistance).
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dard may be no better than no lawyer at all.32 One can imagine situa-
tions in which the presence of a lawyer might be an actual detriment
because it persuades the reviewing body-a commutation panel, for
instance-that the defendant's legal rights have been assiduously ad-
vanced and fairly considered. There is a genuine danger that recog-
nizing a constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings
may actually lower the quality of such representation, while pro-
tracting proceedings with the consequent diminution of a reviewing
board's sympathy for the defendant and his cause.
One might ask, then, why we ought to discuss a putative right that
is so unlikely to be acknowledged by the highest court in the land.
One answer, proposed by this Essay, is that effective counsel at post-
conviction proceedings is essential to realizing the fundamental tenet
of our criminal law-that an accused be tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced according to due process of law.33 Even if the Supreme Court
is reluctant to acknowledge this right because of the (in its view) un-
desirable consequences of such an acknowledgment, it is vital that the
rest of us-the bar, the state judiciary, the academy- understand
that, at a minimum, the nature of contemporary capital litigation re-
quires effective counsel at post-conviction review in order to guaran-
tee our most basic right of constitutional criminal procedure: the
right to adversarial testing of the questions of guilt and death. 4
The classic understanding of what due process requires is inade-
quate to deal with the reality of contemporary capital litigation. The
Supreme Court itself brought about this inadequacy by deciding that
arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing violated the Eighth
Amendment. Whatever else the Court achieved through Furman, it
32. See William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Un-
dermining of the Right to Counse4 4 Wm. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 94 (1995) (arguing that
"Strickland has been roundly and properly criticized for fostering tolerance of abysmal
lawyering").
33. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (requiring that an accused
indigent be provided counsel at a criminal trial because "our state and national constitu-
tions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed
to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before
the law").
34. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (discussing the "crucial role" of counsel in the adver-
sarial system and noting that "a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial
testing is presented to an impartial tribunal"); cf Vick, supra note 21, at 341 n.49 (noting
that "the distinctions between capital and non-capital punishments traditionally have been
invoked to justify greater procedural and substantive protections for capital defendants").
35. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (reversing death
sentences on the ground that they violated the Eighth Amendment); id. at 256 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (agreeing with this result based on the arbitrary and selective application of
the penalty); id. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring) (agreeing with this result based on the
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established that the decision between life and death should be at-
tended by a level of procedural and substantive regularity that it previ-
ously had insisted upon only in relation to the decision concerning
guilt.36 Although Furman addressed the constitutionality of the death
penalty in light of the Eighth Amendment, one may discern in it an
implicit due process standard for evaluating the application of this
penalty. In the previous case of McGautha v. California,3 7 the Court
held that it is not unconstitutional to commit "to the untrammeled
discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital
cases." 8 The concurring opinions in Furman found that the death
sentences in the cases at issue violated the Eighth Amendment be-
cause they were arbitrarily applied.39 Thus, Furman implicitly over-
rules McGautha's holding that the death sentence may be imposed by
juries without any limit to their discretion.40 In this light, Furman
teaches that the defendant is entitled to a reasonable level of due pro-
cess with respect to the decision between life and death.4
It is one thing to articulate a due process standard when the ques-
tion is how to determine the historical fact of guilt or innocence, but
quite another to define the standard when the question is "what
should we do with the killer"? We have had centuries of experience
trying to answer the first question and twenty-five years attempting to
Eighth Amendment's proscription against the arbitrary infliction of severe punishment);
id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (agreeing with this result and pointing to the infrequent
and arbitrary nature of the application of the death sentence).
36. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) ("The Court ... has recog-
nized that the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a corre-
spondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.").
37. 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
38. Id. at 207. But cf id. at 202-06 (noting, despite the absence of a federal constitu-
tional violation, the impossibility of achieving meaningful regularity in the imposition of
capital punishment).
39. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 248 n. 11 (Douglas, J., concurring) (pointing to the defect
of arbitrariness as the common strand among the concurring opinions).
40. See id. (noting that "the Due Process Clause . . . would render unconstitutional
'capital sentencing procedures that are purposely constructed to allow the maximum possi-
ble variation from one case to the next, and [that] provide no mechanism to prevent that
consciously maximized variation from reflecting merely random or arbitrary choice'" (al-
teration in original) (quoting McGuatha, 402 U.S. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
41. See id. at 257 (asserting that discretionary death penalty statutes "are pregnant with
discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal
protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments"); id.
at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the low number of executions carried out
every year leads to the "conclusion... that [the death penalty] is being inflicted arbitrar-
ily"); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that the "Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit
this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed").
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answer the second.42 Whatever one thinks of it, we are committed to
the notion that the adversary system produces as satisfactory answers
to the historical question of whether the defendant committed the
crime as we are likely to get. With respect to determining historical
fact, the important question is whether the proceeding has been ad-
versarial in a meaningful sense of that term. But with respect to the
life or death decision, no consensus has developed that even a genu-
ine adversary system produces as accurate a set of conclusions regard-
ing that decision as any system that government is likely to devise.
II. THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM, TRUTH AND INNOCENCE
Despite its lineage, there is considerable reason to doubt the no-
tion that a single adversarial proceeding to determine historical fact
provides an accused with all the process he deserves.43 This is particu-
larly true if we value acquitting the innocent first among the purposes
of the criminal process.44 Our contemporary criminal process pro-
vides little reason to assume that adversary criminal trials will reliably
acquit those who are in fact innocent.45
First, we believe that to be arrested, charged, and put on trial is to
be guilty.46 While we honor the adversary system as our means of de-
termining historical fact, we do not really believe that this is the insti-
tution that answers the question of who committed the crime. The
police, with some pruning by the prosecutor, do that work. Trials are
there to make sure that the state actually can demonstrate publicly
that the defendant did it, not to engage in an open-ended historical
inquiry.47 While both of these assumptions-that the police and pros-
ecutor accurately determine historical fact and that an adversary trial
provides an effective check on the work of the police and prosecu-
42. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections
on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REv. 355, 357
(1995) (discussing the Court's "course of continuing constitutional regulation of capital
punishment in America" since Furman).
43. See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1317, 1372-75 (1997) (offering reasons to doubt
the adequacy of the adversarial process).
44. See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 9-13,
13-23 (1964) (discussing the competing values of the criminal process, efficiency in con-
trolling crime, and due process, which values protecting the "factually innocent").
45. See generally Givelber, supra note 43, at 1328-34.
46. See id. at 1329-30 (discussing the "core belief shared by virtually all personnel who
work within the criminal justice system that defendants formally accused of crime are
guilty").
47. See id. at 1329 (asserting that an "administrative approach to the guilt determina-
tion process" pervades the current state of criminal law).
1999] 1401
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tor-are open to question, together they justify the existing system. In
essence, then, due process demands that there be a testing of the
state's case that appears adversarial. 4' Due process places no obliga-
tion on the state beyond providing the fact finder with evidence
which, if believed, can support a conclusion of guilt. There is no re-
quirement that the state pursue evidence of innocence as vigorously
as it searches for evidence of guilt,49 or even that the state preserve
evidence that the defendant might use to establish her innocence.5"
Instead, we have the requirement that a minimally competent lawyer
mount a modest challenge to the state's evidence.51 It does not mat-
ter whether the lawyer does not do much for the defendant because
we know that the defendant did it-otherwise he or she would not be
on trial.
52
Indeed, the very certainty that the defendant did it permits the
Court to call for competence on the one hand and ignore the lack of
it on the other. The lax prejudice prong of Strickland53 becomes little
more than a requirement that the police and prosecutor did theirjobs
by selecting the "right" perpetrator.54 When courts employ "lack of
prejudice" as the reason for denying a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, they are saying that there is no need for adversarial testing
because the police and prosecutor appear to have done a competent
job.55
48. See id. at 1332 (describing one view of the adversary system as a system in which
"clever advocates can free a guilty person by outperforming adversaries in front of a passive
factfinder").
49. Cf ExparteBrandley, 781 S.W.2d 886, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc) (iden-
tifying the inadequacy of an investigation as the basis for granting post-conviction relief in
a rare case).
50. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (holding that "unless a criminal
defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially
useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law").
51. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (noting that an attorney
"has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable
adversarial testing process" (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932))).
52. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
53. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 691-96 (requiring, as part of an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, that defendant prove affirmatively that her counsel's errors prejudiced
her by being "so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable").
54. See generally Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex
Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997) (arguing that Strick-
lands prejudice standard is too narrow and inadequately addresses "the fairness of the
proceedings").
55. Cf id. at 284 (arguing that "ineffective assistance is easily alleged but almost impos-
sible to prove").
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Appearances are central, of course, because whether the police
and prosecutor have done a competent job depends upon an evalua-
tion of the evidence which they have gathered and disclosed. It can-
not rest upon whatever they know but do not disclose because a
reviewing court cannot know what has never been revealed. The ad-
versary system pushes counsel for each side to withhold information
helpful to the other side. In civil litigation, we give each side the right
to demand information from the opposition as the approach most
likely to ferret out the truth.56 On the criminal side, however, we do
no such thing. 7 Instead, we rely on the prosecutor's rectitude to in-
sure that the defendant will receive exculpatory information. 8 The
assumption that a prosecutor can believe the defendant to be guilty
and want him to be executed, yet still actively assist the defendant to
undermine the prosecutor's case, is as noble as it is misguided. The
assumption denies the core reality of an advocate's participation in
the adversary system and ignores the systemic assumption that the de-
fendant is guilty to begin with.59
Complementing what the prosecutor or police know and do not
disclose is information that neither the state nor the defense counsel
ever discovers. At the guilt phase, this category of information repre-
sents a particular problem for those who had nothing to do with the
crime for which they are on trial. While no one knows the size of this
group, its importance cannot be overstated. Within the limits of prac-
tical human ingenuity, our system is supposed to come as close as pos-
sible to guaranteeing that the innocent will be acquitted.6 ° In order
to achieve this result when the state has mistakenly charged an inno-
cent person, the system requires an actively engaged competent de-
fense lawyer who takes her client's claims of innocence seriously.6 1
We cannot assume that the state's case against an innocent person will
56. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVL PROCEDURE § 5.2, at 228
(3d ed. 1985) (noting ways in which discovery serves a truth-finding function).
57. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988) (rejecting the "notion that a
prosecutor has a constitutional duty routinely to deliver his entire file to defense counsel'"
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976))).
58. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution").
59. Cf Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 (noting that the "attorney for the sovereign must prose-
cute the accused with earnestness and vigor").
60. But see Packer, supra note 44, at 10 (discussing the "attention [to] be paid to the
efficiency with which the criminal process operates to ... determine guilt" as one of the
two values of the criminal process).
61. See Givelber, supra note 43, at 1375-76 (discussing some systematic obstacles to
achieving this requirement).
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necessarily appear weaker than its case against a guilty one.6 2 The
working presumption is that the defendant is guilty; when this pre-
sumption attaches itself to a credible prima facie case, an innocent
defendant will be convicted unless the defense gives the jury reason to
think otherwise.
These flaws are unlikely to be exposed even by a competent de-
fense lawyer at trial, however, because they relate to information never
revealed to or discovered by the defendant; if it occurs at all, exposure
will take the form of a "missing witness" instruction and a closing argu-
ment pointing to the state's omission. There will be no presentation
of the unrevealed or unknown evidence to the jury.6" When the law-
yer's performance is actually incompetent the chances are quite re-
mote that the jury even will learn that there is an alternative scenario
that points to innocence. The only process that can aid the actually
innocent defendant is one which allows for a post-trial inquiry into
both the evidence that was known but not disclosed and evidence that
was unknown and exculpatory. Indeed, states acknowledge the possi-
bility that trial outcomes can be wrong through the institution of a
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.64
If exonerating the innocent represents a significant goal of our
system of criminal procedure, this process must provide some means
for evaluating whether the defendant was competently and adequately
represented at trial, so that an adversarial determination of guilt in-
deed occurred. This process must also provide a means for determin-
ing whether there was exculpatory information that was withheld from
62. See Bob Herbert, In America; Justice, at Long Last, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, at A31,
available in Lexis, News Library, Nyt File (stating, on the exoneration of Jeffrey Blake eight
years after being convicted for murder on the basis of the subsequently recanted testimony
of a highly unreliable alleged eyewitness, "The thing that scares the hell out of the better
lawyers-and I like to think I was one of them-is representing someone who is innocent"
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Charles Hynes, District Attorney for Brook-
lyn, New York, and former defense attorney)).
63. See Givelber, supra note 43, at 1374 (discussing the incompleteness of police investi-
gations and reports, and noting that "the defendant in the adversary system may fail to
hold the prosecution accountable for omissions and incomplete explanations because the
defense may not be aware that problems exist").
64. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 409-11 (1993) (discussing motions for new
trials based on newly discovered evidence at the state level and the time limits applicable to
these motions). Herrera did not concern a motion for a new trial, but instead a petition for
federal habeas relief based on the "actual innocence" of the prisoner. See id. at 395-98.
The Court noted that "a claim of 'actual innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim, but
instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred
constitutional claim considered on the merits." Id. at 404. Despite the Court's limitation
on using "actual innocence" as a substantive basis for habeas relief, the universality at the
state level of a motion for a new trial suggests a recognition that a trial's outcome is not
always factually accurate.
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the fact finder. While other arrangements are conceivable, the typical
response of states to these concerns is to provide for post-conviction,
collateral proceedings in which these issues can be raised.65 Without
such proceedings, we can never rest easy that the defendant actually
received a true adversarial testing of basic issues of historical fact. Nor
can we be confident that the fact finder was exposed to all the known
relevant evidence.66
III. THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM AND SENTENCING
The sentencing phase of the capital criminal trial requires the
development of a different type of information. There is no view of
the police function, no matter how expansive, which encompasses col-
lecting information that suggests that a guilty defendant ought not be
executed. To the extent that the state has traditionally taken responsi-
bility for gathering information relevant to sentencing, this work has
been done by probation officers reporting to the court. In most capi-
tal states, a pre-sentence report is unlikely to be prepared because it is
the jury rather than the judge who decides the sentence.67 In states
that assign the sentencing authority to the judge and use a pre-sen-
tence report prepared by a probation officer, that report must be dis-
closed in a capital case.68 As with any state-conducted investigation,
however, what is not disclosed to the judge need not be disclosed to
the accused unless probation officers in capital cases are subject to the
65. See generally Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims
After Herrera v. Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 501-15 (1998) (sampling the approach taken
by Illinois, Connecticut, and Texas to claims of actual innocence in post-conviction
proceedings).
66. Cf Dripps, supra note 54, at 278-79 (arguing that in a collateral proceeding, "a
showing of ineffective assistance [at trial] is, without more, proof of an unfair trial"). If we
cannot determine the actual impact of counsel's performance through a rigorous post-trial
analysis, we certainly cannot expect that a trial judge during the trial will be in a position to
make anyjudgment about the adequacy of the representation unfolding in front of him.
Moreover, the only time that ineffectiveness will be raised at trial is when the defendant
personally objects to what is transpiring, because it is unlikely that a trial lawyer will object
to his own performance as it unfolds.
67. See Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitutionality of
Capital Statutes That Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 30 B.C. L. REv.
283, 284 nn.1-3 (1989) (noting that 29 jurisdictions allow a death sentence only if the jury
votes for death, that four jurisdictions impose this sentence by the court alone, and that
the remaining jurisdictions involve some interplay between judge and jury).
68. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 361 (1977) (plurality opinion) (asserting that
"full disclosure of the basis for the death sentence" is required, including a pre-sentence
report); id. at 364 (White, J., concurring) (agreeing with the result on the ground that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits consideration of "secret information" to which the defend-
ant is unable to respond).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:1393
requirements of Brady v. Maryland.69 Because the notion of exculpa-
tory evidence does not have much meaning with respect to a defend-
ant already adjudicated guilty, the line of analysis developed in Brady
and its progeny is unlikely to be of much assistance to the defense in a
sentencing context.
70
With respect to capital sentencing, then, it is the defendant,
rather than the state, who has the practical obligation to identify and
produce evidence pointing towards leniency. The defendant must
also persuade the jury to show leniency. The fairness of putting the
defendant to proof here is open to question. While the defendant
surely knows far more than the state about his own life and how he
has lived it, this does not mean that the defendant-or his lawyer-
will necessarily recognize what life experiences constitute mitigating
facts, or be in a position to present the evidence effectively.72 In view
of the limited resources under which the defense in capital cases typi-
cally operates, defense lawyers frequently confront the choice between
focusing on guilt or focusing on sentencing because focusing on both
may appear (and be) overwhelming.
69. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution").
70. Cf Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (discussing the materiality standard
for what evidence must be disclosed to the defense under United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667 (1985), and noting that "a showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a
preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately
in the defendant's acquittal"); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676-78 (holding that while impeachment
evidence falls within the Brady rule, nondisclosure of impeachment evidence constitutes
constitutional error and mandates an automatic reversal "only if the evidence is material in
the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial").
71. While the burden of showing the applicability of the death sentence is placed upon
the prosecution formally, the reality is that the prosecution typically has no additional evi-
dentiary burden at this point. The state's case for death frequently consists of nothing
more than pointing out to the jury that the evidence already introduced establishes the
required aggravating circumstance and urging the jury to think about the victim as it de-
cides whether the defendant should live.
72. See Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness: Differentiating Be-
tween Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 21, 30 (1997) (discuss-
ing the wide range of evidence that a defendant may present at the sentencing phase,
including "his age, mental impairment, or good character and deeds" (foomotes omit-
ted)); Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the Judicial Conference of the
Second Circuit, 86 COLUM. L. Rv. 1, 2 (1986) (noting that "[t]he federal reports are filled
with stories of counsel who presented no evidence in mitigation of their client's sentences
because they did not know what to offer or how to offer it, or had not read the state's
sentencing statute" (footnotes omitted)); see also Vick, supra note 21, at 403 ("Those most
familiar with the operation of the capital punishment in the United States have frequently
expressed dismay at the surprising number of cases in which little or no evidence is
presented by the defense during sentencing proceedings.").
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The sentencing phase effectively shifts the burden of production
and persuasion to the defendant. 7 Because the sentencing phase
rarely involves any actual dispute over whether an aggravating circum-
stance exists, 4 the issue becomes whether or not the jury should show
the accused mercy. The prosecution is generally entitled to rely on
evidence at the guilt phase to establish the existence of an aggravating
circumstance at the sentencing phase. 75 It is the defendant who bears
the burden of producing evidence of mitigating circumstances.76 Al-
most inevitably, this burden requires the defendant to produce evi-
dence beyond that which was presented at the guilt phase. The law
provides little effective guidance as to what kind of evidence will per-
suade a jury to return a life sentence. Although most statutes identify
factors for the jury to consider, the Supreme Court has made it clear
that a state cannot limit those factors that a juror can consider to be
mitigating, so that, realistically, there are no limits to what a defend-
ant might choose to put before a jury.77 While many statutes call for
the question of life or death to be decided by "weighing" aggravating
against mitigating factors, in practice this approach is as standardless
as Justice Harlan suggested it was in McGautha.78 While some lawyers
73. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
74. Cf James R. Acker & C.S. Lanier, "Parsing This Lexicon ofDeath". Aggravating Factors
in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 30 CRIM. L. BULL. 107, 111 (1994) (noting that "[aggravating]
sentencing factors [may be organized] according to the characteristics of the offender, the
manner in which the crime was committed, offender's motive for the crime, and the char-
acteristics of the victim"). For this reason, the jury typically can find the aggravating sen-
tencing factor from evidence introduced at the guilt phase of the trial.
75. See Crocker, supra note 72, at 30-31 (discussing statutory aggravating circumstances
and noting that "[b]ased on evidence about the crime or the defendant presented by the
prosecution, the jury must find at least one statutory aggravating circumstance in order for
the death penalty to be a possible punishment" (emphasis added; footnotes omitted)).
76. See id. at 31 ("Mitigating circumstances are constitutionally defined as 'any aspect of
a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.'" (quoting Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982))).
77. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 42, at 391 (noting that "the Court's emerging doc-
trine [of the Eighth Amendment's individualization requirement] has motivated every
death penalty jurisdiction to permit the introduction and consideration of 'any' mitigating
factor").
78. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204, 207 (1971) (holding constitutional
the practice of committing sentencing in capital cases to the untrammeled discretion of
the jury and asserting the impossibility of identifying "those characteristics of criminal
homicides and their perpetration which call for the death penalty" and of expressing
"these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sen-
tencing authority"), vacated sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); see also Steiker
& Steiker, supra note 42, at 391 ("If standardless discretion is problematic because it gives
those with a mind to discriminate the opportunity to discriminate, unconstrained consider-
ation of any kind of mitigating evidence is problematic for precisely the same reason.").
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may view the very absence of a standard as an opportunity to present a
compelling narrative of the defendant's life, many others can and do
respond to the unstructured question of whether to take the accused's
life by simply passing it on to the jury.79 Arguments abound to the
effect, "It's up to you-do the right thing and spare his life."8"
To summarize, the Court's focus on the trial as the main event at
which historical truth is reliably found does not take into account the
prevalence of ineffective counsel," the improbability that prosecutors
can police themselves in a way that reliably delivers exculpatory evi-
dence to the defense,82 and our lack of understanding of what a "relia-
ble" sentencing hearing looks like.8" The Court's view of when a
lawyer must be provided may work well when the defendant is guilty,
but it works poorly when the defendant is innocent. It works not at all
when the question is whether the defendant should die.
IV. WHY THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES COLLATERAL COUNSEL IN
CAPITAL CASES
The Court's obsessive focus on the trial as the main and only con-
stitutionally required event does not protect the innocent or guaran-
tee serious consideration of life versus death. Denying a right to
counsel in post-conviction proceedings cannot be justified on the
ground that the defendant has already received all the process that he
is due.84 If counsel is not to be provided at that point, it must be
because counsel is unnecessary or too expensive or too likely to com-
promise the interest in finality.
79. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1858 (1994) (setting forth the entire
closing argument regarding capital sentencing by a defense lawyer in Texas as follows:
"You are an extremely intelligent jury. You've got that man's life in your hands. You can
take it or not. That's all I have to say." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ro-
mero v. Lyaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1989))).
81. See Dripps, supra note 54, at 249-50 (discussing indigent defense in death penalty
cases and stating that "trial counsel in capital cases are often shockingly unqualified, un-
prepared, and unsupported"); StephenJ. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, RethinkingIndi-
gent Defense: Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of
Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CriM. L. Rav. 73, 74 (1993) (noting the "grave
inadequacy of existing systems for serving the indigent," including conflicts of interest be-
tween publicly funded attorneys and their clients who do not pay for their services).
82. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (arguing that it is inconsistent to ex-
pect a prosecutor to aid the defendant with exculpatory information while in the midst of
an adversary system that provides an incentive to withhold information).
83. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 3, 15, 17 and accompanying text.
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The Court has never suggested that a prisoner-will do as well rep-
resenting himself as he would if represented by competent counsel,
and for good reason. It is virtually impossible to conduct any kind of
investigation from prison, much less one that depends upon complete
access to the prosecutor's file. Further, there is no realistic chance
that a prisoner will be able to disentangle even the law surrounding
ineffective assistance and Brady sufficiently to present a credible claim
to the post-conviction court.85 Failure to raise the claim typically will
constitute waiver.
8 6
Because providing counsel is necessary to vindicate our interest
in assuring that the innocent are not executed, and because the bur-
den upon states' resources is not overwhelming-most states provide
for the appointment of counsel either by statute or judicial deci-
sionS7-the interest in finality emerges as the central reason for refus-
ing to recognize a constitutional right to counsel at capital collateral
proceedings. As the Supreme Court of Georgia states, "[A] constitu-
tional right to habeas counsel, carried to its logical conclusion, would
spawn more litigation and delay in an already cumbersome system."88
One way of reconciling these concerns with justice and finality is
to recognize a right to counsel in collateral proceedings for the pur-
pose of raising those claims that could not have been raised effectively
on direct appeal. The United States Supreme Court appeared to ac-
knowledge the viability of this approach in Coleman v. Thompson,s°
where it considered Coleman's argument for "an exception to the
rule [that there is no right to counsel in collateral proceedings] in
85. Justice Kennedy spoke to this point:
It cannot be denied that collateral relief proceedings are a central part of the
review process for prisoners sentenced to death .... [A] substantial proportion of
these prisoners succeed in having their death sentences vacated in habeas corpus
proceedings. The complexity of our jurisprudence in this area, moreover, makes
it unlikely that capital defendants will be able to file successful petitions for collat-
eral relief without the assistance of persons learned in the law.
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86. See id. at 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the difficulty of overcoming a state
determination that a claim is procedurally barred on account of the difficulty of showing
both cause for the procedural default and resulting prejudice, and observing "the strin-
gency with which this Court adheres to procedural default rules").
87. See Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 192 (Ga. 1999) (listing 31 states that provide
for "state-funded counsel to indigent death-row habeas corpus petitioners" by statute, and
noting the "right to qualified legal representation for capital petitioners in federal habeas
corpus proceedings" under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (4) (B)).
88. Id. at 191. This court also noted that a constitutional right to counsel upon state
habeas corpus would generate the additional Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assist-
ance of habeas counsel. Id.
89. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
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those cases where state collateral review is the first place a prisoner
can present a challenge to his conviction."9" The Court refused to
address this argument broadly, however, because Coleman's entitle-
ment to a forum in which to raise ineffectiveness had been honored
through the Virginia collateral post-conviction inquiry into the ade-
quacy of the performance of his trial counsel.91
On this view, the defendant would be provided with counsel at
post-conviction proceedings to raise claims which could not be effec-
tively raised on direct appeal. While these claims, if raised appropri-
ately, would be preserved for presentation in federal court, the failure
to raise other claims would not be. This approach acknowledges, even
if not entirely implementing, the concerns of both justice and finality.
This approach is consistent with Coleman.92
Although lower courts have been unenthusiastic about acknowl-
edging the possibility that Coleman creates an exception to the rule
that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction
proceedings,9" the recognition of the right to counsel in the limited
circumstances suggested would have only a minimal impact on federal
habeas litigation. As the law currently stands, a state prisoner who
waives a claim in the state system is nonetheless entitled to raise the
claim in federal habeas if the failure of the federal court to consider
90. Id. at 755.
91. Id.
92. Coleman held that counsel's ineffectiveness does not constitute the kind of cause
which permits a federal court to excuse a state procedural default unless "counsel's ineffec-
tiveness ... is an independent constitutional violation." Id. The approach suggested here
requires counsel for the express purpose of raising particular kinds of claims; if counsel's
ineffectiveness results in a default on such claims, this ineffectiveness should constitute
cause for purposes of considering the claims afresh in federal court. If counsel's inepti-
tude instead relates to a failure to raise other kinds of claims, Coleman's bar would apply.
93. See Mackall v. Angelone, 131 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the "conten-
tion that Coleman recognizes a loophole and that [a petitioner] possesses a right to effective
assistance of counsel to pursue in his state collateral proceedings a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial or appellate counsel"); Hill v.Jones, 81 F.3d 1015, 1025 (11th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting "the proposition that collateral counsel's ineffectiveness can serve as cause ex-
cusing a procedural default" under the purported Coleman exception); Bonin v. Calderon,
77 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the petitioner's argument that "he had the
right to effective counsel on his first set of federal habeas petitions[ ] because that was his
first opportunity he had to challenge his appellate counsel's performance"); Nolan v.
Armontrout, 973 F.2d 615, 617 (8th Cir. 1992) (rejecting petitioner's argument for the
Coleman exception because there is "little doubt how the Supreme Court would decide the
question" left open in that case); Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 191 (Ga. 1999) (noting
that the argument that there is a constitutional right to a lawyer in a habeas proceeding in
which a petitioner can raise for the first time an ineffective assistance claim "has since been
rejected by every federal court of appeals that has considered it").
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the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.94
While the Court has resisted providing a simple definition of the "mis-
carriage" standard, "probable innocence"-defined as "evidence of in-
nocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the
outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was
free of nonharmless constitutional error"95-presumably meets this
standard.
The proposed Coleman exception typically embraces the two con-
stitutional claims-ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel,
and failure to disclose exculpatory material-that relate most directly
to the possibility that an innocent person has been convicted or is
going to be executed.96 If the exception is recognized, then the state
would be responsible for providing a lawyer to raise these claims.
When a lawyer fails to raise these claims, or does an inadequate job,
then the prisoner can assert that a federal court should consider his
claim because it was his lawyer's incompetence that caused the forfei-
ture of the claim in state court.97
Even if the federal court were to agree that the lawyer's ineffec-
tiveness was sufficient cause to ignore the petitioner's failure to raise
the claim adequately in state court, the petitioner also would have to
demonstrate that he suffered prejudice by not being able to raise the
claim below.98 Although the meaning of "prejudice" is unclear,99 eve-
ryone agrees that it begins with a showing of a constitutional violation.
In order to show this under Strickland's test for ineffective assistance,
the petitioner must demonstrate that "counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is relia-
ble."' In order to show constitutional prejudice under Brady, the
petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability
that, had the [suppressed] evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
94. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (stating that "where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the proce-
dural default").
95. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995).
96. See supra Parts II, 11.
97. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755 (discussing "an exception to the rule [that there is no
right to counsel in state collateral proceedings] .. . in those cases where state collateral
review is the first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction").
98. SeeJAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAs CoRPus PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 26.3c, at 1108-12 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing the petitioner's obligation to show prej-
udice in order to circumvent the procedural default doctrine).
99. See id. at 1108 (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has not yet provided a precise
definition of the 'prejudice' half of the 'cause and prejudice' exception to the procedural
default doctrine").
100. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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result of the proceeding would have been different."1"1 Thus, even
under the proposed Coleman exception, it is clear that the petitioner
would be required to cast doubt on the reliability of his trial in order
to secure relief.
With respect to a federal court considering whether a claim could
not have been adequately presented at the state level, then, the differ-
ence between rejecting or adopting the Coleman exception amounts to
the difference between a federal court determining whether a Strick-
land or Brady violation probably affected the outcome of the trial, or
determining whether such violations led to the conviction of a proba-
bly innocent person. The former is the classic prejudice inquiry,
while the latter is the "miscarriage of justice" inquiry. Because claims
raised under the Coleman exception would be decided under the latter
standard, which still requires an evaluation of the effect of error on
the outcome of the trial, it is difficult to believe that constitutionally
requiring appointment of counsel in a capital post-conviction pro-
ceeding that provides the first opportunity to raise a constitutional
challenge to a petitioner's conviction would truly compromise the in-
terest in finality.102
The interest in finality would be served further by assuring that
the conduct of the post-conviction proceeding itself does not generate
further proceedings. The defendant would be bound by the new
claims that his post-conviction lawyer raises. This makes sense if the
right to a lawyer flows in significant part from the inability of even a
competent lawyer to raise claims central to innocence and life on di-
rect appeal. Whatever the source of the right, however, the lawyer
should be free to raise any claims that state law permits. While one
could argue that the lawyer should be permitted to raise only constitu-
tional claims for which there would otherwise be no forum, this limita-
tion would be both unprecedented and unwise. Our jurisprudence
knows no comparable limitation on the right of an attorney to raise
claims that are appropriate under state and federal law to a forum
which has jurisdiction over the claims. Moreover, the structure of
101. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality opinion).
102. The Supreme Court of Georgia implied that adopting the Coleman exception could
lead to an infinite regress of ineffectiveness claims. See Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186,
191 (Ga. 1999) (noting that a constitutional right to state habeas counsel would lead to an
additional Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel). This no-
tion of an infinite regress is unrealistic, however, because, under the proposed Coleman
exception, the prisoner still would have to demonstrate that the incompetence of trial or
appellate counsel, or the state's withholding of exculpatory material, undermined the reli-
ability of the original verdict. Nothing in the Constitution entitles a prisoner to more than
one fair resolution of this question.
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most state habeas systems is such that the only claims a litigant can
pursue in a state collateral proceeding are claims that could not be
raised on direct appeal, such as ineffective assistance of counsel and
Brady claims.1"3 Finally, because ineffective assistance of trial counsel
is the gateway through which "waived" trial claims can be raised in a
post-conviction proceeding, it is difficult to see what would be gained
through adding the complexity that a constitutionally required lawyer
can only raise certain claims and not others.
Whether this proposal justifies the doctrinal uncertainty it will
generate depends upon whether the right to counsel at post-convic-
tion proceedings actually advances the interest of justice. If we are
satisfied with the results of the adversary process in capital cases, then
there is no reason to believe that the addition of a right to counsel in
post-conviction proceedings will advance the interests ofjustice. If, as
I have argued, we should not be so confident that an adversarial pro-
ceeding results in as just a set of results as we ought to seek, it is still a
fair question as to whether the existence of a state-provided post-con-
viction lawyer would increase our confidence significantly. The inade-
quacy of judicially appointed counsel for capital indigents has been
noted repeatedly.10 4 Will we achieve anything meaningful if we create
a system in which these same lawyers now come forward to provide
representation in post-conviction proceedings? If $1000 fees'0 5 do
not guarantee effective representation at trial, why should they pro-
vide effective post-conviction representation?
A cynic might suggest that, if the current low threshold for com-
petence applies to collateral counsel, recognizing a right to counsel at
that stage may do little beyond reassuring us that no prisoner has
gone to his death unrepresented. If courts appoint collateral counsel
103. See 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 36 (1976) ("Questions which may or should be decided
at the trial or reviewed upon appeal or error have no place in a habeas corpus proceeding,
at least within the period of possibility of an appeal, or where an appeal is pending."); see
also Austin v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 237 Md. 314, 316, 206 A.2d 145, 147 (1965) (dis-
missing several claims in a petition for post-conviction relief on the ground that "[t]hese
are matters which, if meritorious, could have been raised by a direct appeal and his failure
to do so bars them as grounds in this proceeding" (citing Dorris v. Warden, 222 Md. 586,
158 A.2d 105 (1960))).
104. See Bright, supra note 80, at 1841 (noting that inadequate legal representation for
the poor "is pervasive in those jurisdictions which account for most of the death
sentences"); Marshall, supra note 72, at 1 (stating that "capital defendants frequently suffer
the consequences of having trial counsel who are ill-equipped to handle capital cases");
supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of ineffective counsel).
105. This is the maximum payment for out-of-court preparation for representing a capi-
tal defendant in Alabama. See ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(d) (1995); see also Bright, supra note
80, at 1853 (discussing the effect on representation of inadequate compensation of attor-
neys in capital cases).
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from the same pool of practitioners from which they pick trial coun-
sel, and if the level of practice of these defense attorneys is as inade-
quate as critics suggest, then the benefits of requiring counsel may be
illusory. Indeed, death row inmates may fare better with volunteer
counsel for whom a given case is likely to be a singular brush with the
capital punishment system than with lawyers who become habituated
to processing post-conviction claims. An out-of-state lawyer will not be
as limited as a local lawyer by social and economic constraints when it
comes to challenging the conduct of both the defense counsel and
prosecutor, the very claims which raise the most significant concerns
about a defendant's potential innocence. On the other hand, the out-
of-town lawyer's representation will inevitably suffer from a lack of
easy access to the relevant actors and knowledge of the local legal
culture.
There is no way to know with certainty whether death row in-
mates generally will be better served by volunteer counsel than by con-
stitutionally required counsel. My guess, however, is that the
recognition of the right will advance the interests of death row in-
mates and ofjustice. There are great variations among the states that
embrace capital punishment as well as between various localities
within the same state. We should not make judgments about the ad-
visability of requiring or not requiring counsel as a constitutional mat-
ter based upon an image of litigators from a large New York law firm
representing a condemned killer before a judge in rural Alabama.
The city of Philadelphia has sent just as many men to death row as the
entire state of Alabama. 10 6 Moreover, as maligned as they tend to be,
the lawyers providing front line representation in capital cases in this
country may win about as many sentencing hearings as they lose.1 0 7
Jurors impose death in fewer than half of the cases in which a prosecu-
tor seeks it."0 8 As with so many other features of the criminal process,
106. See Vick, supra note 21, at 386 (noting that "Philadelphia hands out the second-
highest number of death sentences of any American city, and more individuals have been
sentenced to death in Philadelphia in the post-Furman era than in twenty-two of the thirty-
seven death penalty states combined" (footnotes omitted)); Daniel P. Blank, Book Note,
Mumia Abu-Jamal and the "Death Row Phenomenon," 48 STAN. L. REV. 1625, 1636-37 (1996)
("The death row population in Philadelphia County 'is the third largest of any county's in
the nation, close behind Houston's Harris County and Los Angeles County-counties far
more populous and murderous than Philadelphia.'" (quoting Tina Rosenberg, The Deadli-
estD.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 22)).
107. See RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 29 (1991) (noting "the
general disinclination of capital juries to sentence most convicted capital offenders to
death," and citing a study showing a capital sentencing rate in Georgia of 54%).
108. See Richard Lowell Nygaard, On Death as a Punishment, 57 U. PrrT. L. REv. 825, 831
(1996) (discussing the fact that after local prosecutors make the choice to pursue a capital
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while the reality of what lawyers do falls far short of the ideal, the
accused and condemned are better off with lawyers than without
them.
V. CONCLUSION
Those who are condemned to death should be afforded counsel
for purposes of pursuing state collateral relief. Giarratano and Finley
notwithstanding, the Constitution requires that counsel be provided
as the only practicable means for ensuring that people are not con-
demned to death inaccurately.1l ' There is no feasible way to deter-
mine whether the defendant received adequate representation on
direct review because there is no way of knowing what it is that coun-
sel did or did not do. There is no feasible way to determine whether
the prosecution withheld exculpatory material on direct review be-
cause the reviewing court will not know what evidence was not dis-
closed. Because both kinds of errors create particular risks for
innocent individuals who are falsely accused, our professed solicitude
for this class of defendants demands that we afford them a meaningful
opportunity to demonstrate that their conviction and sentence were
flawed.
The Court's doctrinal rationale for rejecting the right to counsel
is both unpersuasive and inconsistent with more contemporary deci-
sions.110 The Court's finality concerns can be accommodated in part
without significantly increasing the number or type of issues that can
sentence, "[I]ocally selected juries are thereafter in control, and sentence but few to die");
Eric Schnapper, The Capital Punishment Conundrum, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 715, 725 (1986) (re-
viewing WELSH S. WHITE, LIFE IN THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CAPITAL CASES)
("The available sentencing studies make it possible to delineate the categories of cases in
which the likelihood that the death penalty would be imposed is well under half, and in
many instances one in ten."); cf. Bright, supra note 80, at 1841 (stating that "the death
penalty is imposed, on average, in only 250 cases of the approximately 20,000 homicides
that occur each year in the United States").
109. The recognition that representation is necessary to ensure accuracy and fairness
goes deep in the Court's capital jurisprudence. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
the Court held:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is inca-
pable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mind-
edness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not,
to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law.
Id. at 71; see also Vick, supra note 21, at 357 (discussing Powell and stating that "the Court
recognized that meaningful assistance of counsel in capital cases was indispensable to the
procedural fairness of a capital trial").
110. See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text (discussing Mississippi state case law
that, following M.L.B. v. SL.J, 519 U.S. 102 (1996), required a lawyer for prisoners seeking
collateral review).
1416 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:1393
be raised in federal court on post-conviction review. While the practi-
cal effect of mandating representation at this stage may not be quite
as dramatic as some of its advocates might assert, it is likely to improve
overall the quality ofjustice. This result justifies the requirement that
defendants sentenced to death be represented in collateral
proceedings.
